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Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes.  A stimulus
to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this
paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently
high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing
markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The
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james.anderson.1@bc.eduThe institutions that support trade have recently re-entered the main-
stream of trade theory. The focus of this paper is on mechanisms whereby
trade causes institutions as well as the other way round. The idea is old:
the Scottish school of liberal political economy was optimistic about posi-
tive knock-on from trade to institutions. Here is Adam Smith (1976) in the
Wealth of Nations,1 crediting Hume: \...commerce and manufactures gradu-
ally introduced order and good government, and with them the liberty and
security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before
lived in almost a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile
dependency on their superiors. This, though it has been the least observed,
is by far the most important of all their eects."
Contemporary empirical work applying the gravity model emphasizes the
importance of implicit trade costs associated with institutions and their vari-
ation across countries (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Rauch and Trindade,
1999, 2002) and time (Baier and Bergstrand, 2001). The rst paper provides
results which suggest that more open economies in the policy sense have bet-
ter institutions.2 The last paper shows that the trade liberalization, transport
improvements and other developments of the last 50 years leave unexplained
a large positive residual growth in world trade. Both patterns are suggestive
of positive knock-on eects traveling from trade to institutions.
But recent experience with trade liberalization shows that some episodes
exhibit far less trade expansion than anticipated based on the application
of standard trade models. See Schi and Winters (2003) for a review of
9 episodes of developing country regional agreements, of which 2 decreased
trade and 2 others increased trade very modestly. This suggests that reduc-
tions in one type of trade cost may be oset by increases in other costs, such
as negative knock-on eects on institutions.
This paper provides a formal models in which either positive or negative
knock-on from trade to institutions is possible. It focuses on the demand
for contract enforcement because the cross country variation of enforcement
quality is not well explained by by considerations of the cost of enforcement.
For example, Anderson and Marouiller (2002) present cross-country evidence
on variation in the quality of institutions of contract enforcement and extor-
tion that cannot be explained by variation in the capacity to enforce alone.3
1Book III, Chapter IV. The whole chapter is exhilarating reading.
2This pattern is pointed out in Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004.
3Enforcement cost plays an obvious role: richer countries have better institutions on
average because they can aord it. But the correlation of institutional quality and incomeThe model builds on that of Anderson and Young (2006). Imperfect con-
tract enforcement is modeled as a parametric probability that a `court' will
enforce a contract in default. The model is sharply distinct from that of the
standard model of the contract literature. In the standard model, contracts
are perfectly enforceable on those attributes of exchange that are veriable,
and the analysis focuses on the implications of limits to veriability. See
Anderson and Young (2006) for an extended discussion.
The setting is a stylized international marketplace in which it is natural
to think of foreigners receiving treatment determined by `rules' enforced by
a `court'. The rules and court processes are to some degree malleable in a
preliminary stage during which the traders commit to the `rules' and their
enforcement by a `court'. `Rules' and `courts' are understood to include
both formal law processes and informal customs backed by social sanctions.
Contract enforcement is assumed to be costless for simplicity, keeping the
focus on the demand for enforcement.
Some agents holding contracts receive favorable draws on their outside
options and hence default. The victims of default have the opportunity to
search for partners in a matching `spot' market as an alternative to renego-
tiation with the defaulter. All victims turn to the spot market in equilib-
rium because at least some potential partners will not have defaulted and
thus have random draws for their outside options. Thus victims receive a
better expected price on the spot market. Successful matches trade at bar-
gained prices that are a convex combination of the outside options of the
parties. Non-defaulted or enforced contracts are executed at the contract
price. Trade is inecient in such a setting because unmatched spot traders
go home without exchanging goods but having incurred sunk costs that ex
ante were covered in expected value. Anderson and Young show that the
excess side of the market will prefer less than perfect enforcement.
This paper builds a theory of endogenous enforcement in this setting. The
comparative statics of enforcement are examined rst in a single market and
then in two interdependent markets in which competing groups of traders
choose enforcement strategies.
The essence of the enforcement choice problem for excess side traders
is that a congestion externality on the spot market that accompanies im-
perfectly enforced forward contracts. Better enforcement worsens the con-
gestion externality directly by removing partners from the spot market (as
per capita is very far from perfect.
2fewer would-be defaulters get away with it), but better enforcement lessens
the congestion externality indirectly by inducing more scarce side partners
to enter trade in the rst place by raising their expected gains from trade.
The optimal enforcement choice balances the two forces. The main business
of this paper is to analyze the eect of changes in key parameters on the
optimal enforcement level.
Positive knock-on from trade to institutions holds if trade-increasing
changes in parameters improve the enforcement of contracts. Such parame-
ter changes include increases in importers' willingness-to-pay, reductions in
exporters' procurement costs, reductions in trade costs and reductions in the
dispersion of the shocks to outside options which induce default on the excess
side of the market. Optimism is justied if the elasticity of response from
the scarce side of the market is suciently large relative to the elasticity of
response from the excess side of the market.
Trade costs divide into those that are paid upon the execution of trade,
such as taris and other costs associated with policy barriers, and those
that are sunk at the time of exchange. The channels through which the two
types of costs operate are quite dierent in the model, but the qualitative
conclusion about their eect on the optimal enforcement choice turns out to
be the same.
The paper goes on to bring a rival market into competition with the
rst, allowing the contract enforceability oered to international traders to
be determined by political pressure from local traders. Since the markets
compete indirectly for scarce side traders through the enforceability of con-
tracts they oer, the analysis of the rule setting game focuses on a Nash
equilibrium. Optimism about the benet of competition between markets is
valid if contract enforcement strategies are complements. In this case, adding
new markets, such as arises with globalization, will improve the enforcement
of contracts on old markets. In contrast, when enforcement strategies are
substitutes, globalization worsens contract enforcement on old markets. In-
stitutional regress of this sort due to globalization may correspond to what
some anti-globalization critics have in mind.
The same basic structure illuminates the desirability of international co-
operation on enforcement: with strategic complementarity, cooperation will
improve enforcement still more while with strategic substitutability, coop-
eration will worsen enforcement. Cooperation being achieved more readily
through a unitary government, the results suggest insights into commercial
empires of past and present.
3The model is part of a wider literature on trade and insecurity, and the
institutions which ameliorate insecurity. The most directly related work is
Dixit (2003), in which costly perfect contract enforcement is contrasted with
informal enforcement sustained by reputation, a process that breaks down as
markets grow large. Araujo and Ornelas (2007) also consider reputation in
a dynamic model of information accumulation, where enforcement enhances
reputation but may slow down the accumulation of reputation. Greif (2005)
emphasizes that modeling the institutions that support exchange should be
embedded in rich historical context, illustrated by his analysis of medieval
contract enforcement institutions. In terms of this paper, his advice is to
analyze changes in the enforcement probability by using case studies. See
Anderson and Bandiera (2006) and Anderson (2007) for analysis of trade,
extortion and the protection of trade. See McLaren and Newman (2003) for
analysis of the eect of trade on risk sharing institutions in labor markets.
McLaren (2000) considers the choice of vertical integration vs. disintegration
in a model where the thickness of the market permits arms length transac-
tions even when input suppliers will be held up. See Rodrik (1997) for a
broader informal statement of the eect of trade on breaking down security
of employment. In turn this literature is part of a much wider literature on
endogenous institutions and economic development.
Section 1 reviews the model of Anderson and Young (2006). Section 2
deploys the model to examine the liberal hypothesis in an isolated market
where `home' traders organize their trading system rules to optimally interact
with a set of non-strategic foreign traders. Section 3 introduces a second
market with `foreign' traders who also design their rules optimally, both
strategically playing Nash against each other in a setting where the rest of
the world plays passively in terms of rules aecting its traders. Section 4
analyzes commercial rivalry in this setting. Section 5 concludes.
1 The Basic Setup
Risk neutral buyers and sellers meet to exchange a good in a trading zone
which they enter at a deterministic cost that generally diers from trader to
trader. The trading cost schedules determine the ex ante demand and supply
schedules, as further explained below.
Each buyer buys one unit of the good, which accounts for an innitesimal
share of the market. A buyer anticipates his willingness-to-pay based on re-
4selling the purchased unit back in his home market at a price b + ; a seller
anticipates procuring the good in his home market at a price c   . Here,
b and c are xed numbers; ; are random disturbances with zero means,
unknown at the time that the traders have to sink their costs of entering the
trading zone, but realized immediately afterward. The disturbances () for
the various buyers (sellers) are identically independently distributed and all
disturbances are pairwise independent.
A buyer who enters and executes a deal at price p receives payo b+ p;
a buyer who enters, but executes no deal, returns home to buy and re-sell
the good at b +  and receives zero payo. A seller who enters and executes
a deal receives payo p   c + ; a seller who enters, but does not execute,
returns home to resell the good at c    and receives zero payo.
Before sinking trading costs, each trader can enter into a contract to
deliver the good. The market mechanism for such contracts costlessly deter-
mines a market-clearing price. Once he learns his own benet/cost distur-
bance, each party to a contract must decide whether or not to repudiate it,
knowing the probability distributions of disturbances of all traders, but not
the disturbance suered by his counter-party. A victim of default costlessly
appeals to a `court', which enforces a proportion  2 [0;1] of the repudiated
contracts.  is a parameter at the stages where trading decisions are made.
The victim of a repudiated, unenforced contract must choose between (i)
renegotiating with the repudiator, (ii) returning to his home market or (iii)
entering the spot market. Anderson and Young show that under plausible
restrictions, an equilibrium in this setup has these properties:
(a) The victim of a repudiated, unenforced contract enters the spot mar-
ket, i.e., he neither renegotiates with the repudiator nor goes home.
(b) Traders on the scarce side of the spot market never repudiate a con-
tract.
Property (a) is based on the intuitive notion that a repudiator reveals
his favorable outside option, so the spot market is more attractive with its
mix of random draws of outside options and repudiators. Property (b) only
holds under a restriction on the spread of outside options on the scarce side,
imposed to simplify the setup for clarity.
On the spot market, any trader has but one chance of being matched with
a counter-party, then bargains one-on-one with common information about
each other's valuations. The spot market contains all parties to non-executed
contracts, but will also contain traders who enter without previously having
contracted, based on expected returns which cover their trade costs. Thus
5the spot market typically has a mismatch between supply and demand. We
assume that all scarce side traders match, but on the excess side, some must
return home without trading.
Excess side traders shift ex ante between the spot and the forward markets
(i.e. between not contracting and contracting) until their expected return is
the same in both. Their equilibrating movement determines the contract
price. In a rational expectations equilibrium, excess side traders' subjective
beliefs about the probability that they will match on the spot market equal
the objective probability.
The expected price received from the compound of all the possibilities
results in a buyers' price pb and a sellers' price ps; derived below. The het-
erogenous trade costs of buyers and sellers are described by the increasing
functions tb(qb) and ts(qs); and the equilibrium volume of potential trade on
each side is given by competitive entry based on expected payos and risk
neutral behavior:
p




s = c + t
s(q
s): (2)
The paper concentrates on the case of buyers being on the excess side,
without loss of generality.
1.1 Buyers
Buyers can contract or enter the spot market directly where they seek a match
with sellers. The various possibilities and their payos are summarized in
Figure 1. It is very helpful in learning the model to work back and forth
from the text to Figure 1.
6 
All matches result in asymmetric Nash bargaining, where the threat
points are the zero net payos the traders receive if they return home. Bar-
gaining ends in the price:
!(b + ) + (1   !)(c   )
7where ! 2 (0;1) indexes the seller's bargaining power. Conditional on a
match, spot buyers expect to pay:
p
  E[!(b + ) + (1   !)(c   )] = !b + (1   !)c: (3)
Conditional on a failure to match, they expect to pay b. Therefore, a
buyer who directly enters the spot market expects to pay:
p
b = p
 + (1   )b: (4)
where  is the probability of matching, to be determined in equilibrium.
Let pC be the price that would be paid by contracting buyers who exe-
cute, including those who repudiate their contracts but nd them enforced
nevertheless. After contracts have been signed, both parties sink the cost of
entering the trading zone. Each buyer then learns the price b +  at which
he can sell the good in his home market; each (foreign) seller learns the price
c    at which he can procure the good in his home market. Traders then
decide whether or not to repudiate their contracts; under our properties (a)
and (b), repudiators who evade enforcement and their victims then enter the
spot market.
A buyer who suers disturbance  expects to negotiate a price p + !
on the spot market if he matches; otherwise, he expects to pay b +  on his
home market. Therefore, a buyer who fails to execute his contract expects
to pay (p +!)+(1 )(b+). The disturbance at which this equals the




! + 1   
: (5)
A buyer expects to pay less than the contract price on the spot market
if and only if he realizes a disturbance  < . Thus, across the buyer






where f() is the marginal probability (density) function of ; assumed to
be piecewise continuous over its support [;]:
We now compute the buyer's ex ante gross benets from a contract, taking
account of his option to default. Given a rate of enforcement  2 [0;1];
contracts are executed at rate:
8 = 1   F + F (6)
A buyer who does not execute his contract must have chosen to repudiate
it. The expected price eect of the disturbances which induce repudiation
is the expected value of those disturbances that are less than  times the






m() is negative, being less than the zero mean of the distribution of .
The buyer expects to pay p + !m() if he matches on the spot market;
b + !m() if he fails to match and returns home. Thus, by (4), conditional
on non-execution, the buyer on the contract market expects to pay:
[p
 + !m(
)] + (1   )[b + m(
)] = p
b + (! + 1   )m(
):
Overall, the buyer who contracts expects to pay:
p
C + (1   )[p
b + (! + 1   )m(
)]:
Buyers shift between the contract and the spot markets until this equals the




)(! + 1   )(1   )=;  < 1: (7)
(7) is the premium over the expected spot price that buyers are willing to pay
for a contract, because if they suer an unfavorable benet disturbance, then
they have the option to repudiate the contract and seek a lower spot price.
Eliminating pC between (5) and (7), we conclude that equilibrium between








This determines the critical value  = () compatible with equilibrium,
given an execution rate  2 [0;1].
We can solve for the contract price as a function of  by noting that, in
equilibrium, the rate of execution  must generate a repudiation rate F(())
via (8) that conrms (6), i.e.:
1    = (1   )F(()) (9)
9Anderson and Young, Lemma 1, show that there exists a unique () sat-
isfying (8) and a unique () satisfying (9). See the Appendix for a formal
statement and proof of all the lemmas, reproduced from Anderson and Young
and applied here.
This implies that the critical disturbance compatible with equilibrium
depends only on the distribution of disturbances  and the parametric rate
of enforcement; it does not depend on the probability  of a match nor on
the bargaining power parameter !: Then (()) determines the equilibrium
values for F and m: Henceforth ; F and m shall be understood to take these
equilibrium values unless other arguments of these functions are specied.
Given buyer beliefs about ; pCis then determined by (7) and (4).
1.2 Sellers
The above calculation allows for excess demand in the spot market ( < 1)
as well as excess supply ( = 1). A symmetrical derivation is possible for
sellers. Below, we present the sellers' decisions only for the case where the
spot market equilibrium exhibits excess demand. We can show that sellers
then always sign contracts, never renegotiate if faced with a defaulter and
never default (provided the disturbances to their outside options are not too
large).
The proportion of buyers in the spot market who have defaulted on con-
tracts equals the ratio of seller victims of default to total buyers in the spot
market. The result that traders who would be on the short side of the spot
market never repudiate contracts implies that this ratio equals , the buyer's
probability of matching on the spot market. Defaulting buyers suer a ben-
et disturbance of m < 0 on average, so the impact of their disturbances
on the spot price that sellers expect to negotiate is !m. Seller victims




C + (1   )(p
 + !m): (10)
Solving (7) for pC and substituting into (10):
p
s = p
b + (1   )p




s + (1   )(1   )(b + m   p
): (12)
10In the last term in (12), b + m   p equals the premium over the spot price
expected by buyers who avoid executing their contracts, fail to match and
therefore pay their home price, which they expect to be b+m. (1 )(1 ) is
the joint probability of the latter two events. Thus, (1 )(1 )(b+m p)
is the additional amount that buyers expect to pay over what sellers expect
to receive because buyers can end up purchasing at home rather than from
sellers.
In an excess demand equilibrium, sellers always sign contracts because
their expected price with a contract exceeds the price that they expect if
they enter the spot market uncovered. This can be seen from (11), (3), (4)




[(1 )+!=(1 )] > 0: (13)
1.3 Equilibrium
To determine equilibrium, we specify the structure of demand and supply
in more detail. Risk neutral buyers demand the good (enter the trading
zone) at price p if their trading cost is weakly less than the gain b   p that
they expect. Risk neutral sellers supply the good (enter the trading zone)
at price p if their trading cost is weakly less than the gain p   c that they
expect. Ordering buyers and sellers by increasing trading cost, let td(q) be
the trading cost of the marginal buyer when the total quantity bought is q;
let ts(q) be the trading cost of the marginal seller when the quantity sold is q.
The ex ante demand at price p is the d = d(p) such that the marginal buyer
is indierent between trading or not trading, i.e.,td(d) + b = p. The ex ante
supply at price p is the s = s(p) such that the marginal seller is indierent
between trading or not trading, i.e., ts(s) + c = p.
The expected outcome of bargaining on the spot market is the p specied
in (3). If d(p) > (= = <)s(p), then, absent a contract market, the spot
market would exhibit excess demand (equilibrium/ excess supply). We shall
show that this conclusion remains valid after the introduction of the contract
market. For concreteness, we focus on the excess demand case where d(p) >
s(p); the excess supply case follows from symmetry.
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the ex ante subjective probability
of a match for the excess side and of a match with a defaulter for the scarce
side must equal the ex post objective probability. Thus, the equilibrium 
satises:




The numerator on the right side equals the number of sellers who are in
the spot market because their contracts were repudiated. The denomina-
tor equals the number of buyers in the spot market, i.e., the total number
committed to trade, less those whose contracts are executed. Anderson and
Young, Lemma 2, show that for each  2 [0;1], (14) has a unique solution
 2 (0;1). The  determined above denes an excess demand equilibrium.
The model is closed by specifying conditions under which non-negotiation
by all victims of repudiation is indeed in their interests and the only defaulters
are on the excess side. See Anderson and Young, Lemmas 3 and 4. The
condition to rule out default on the scarce side is to make the disturbances
on the scarce side of the market suciently small compared to those on the
excess side of the market.
We analyzed the equilibrium by determining the endogenous variables as
functions of the rate of contract execution , then determined  as a func-
tion of the enforcement rate . Similarly, we analyze the impact of  on the
endogenous variables via . A subscript indicates partial dierentiation with
respect to the corresponding variable; for functions with only one argument
(such as (());m(()) or F(()); a subscript indicates total dierentia-
tion. Anderson and Young, Lemma 5, show that  < 0; m < 0 and F < 0:
Thus, key endogenous variables are monotonic in . While  itself need not
be monotonic in ; Anderson and Young provide a sucient condition, es-
sentially requiring that the cumulative density function not be too elastic.
For the uniform distribution case,  =
p
. See Lemma 6. This paper will
assume that  is everywhere increasing in .
Anderson and Young show that sellers' prots always rise with the ex-
ecution rate. (The proof is not trivial but inessential for present purposes










Here, the response of  to  can have either sign, and indeed buyers' prots
and the match probability need not be well behaved in . Anderson and
Young present a full global analysis of these implicit functions. For present
purposes, it is only necessary to note that an interior maximum for buyer
12prots, if there is one, requires a local maximum of the probability of match-
ing; that is d=d = 0 at a point where d2=d2 < 0:
2 Is Commerce Civilizing?
The terms of commerce are governed by rules of behavior toward outsiders
which are to some degree malleable. These rules include both formal law
court procedures and the customs and mores of the individual market. The
latter are typically given great weight in formal judicial procedures as well.
The traders on the excess side of the market are competitive individual actors
in their trading decisions, but act collectively in evolving their customs. It
is natural to model this process with the assumption that excess side traders
collectively adopt rules which serve their interests. Thus we assume that the
rules are chosen to maximize  in a stage which is logically prior to their
trading decisions.
We analyze one market in isolation in this section. This partial equilib-
rium structure is for analytic clarity and convenience, but is at least some-
what realistic and can be defended as follows. (1) Most trading institutions
have their own idiosyncratic details which form the customary understand-
ing of what a contract means. Undoubtedly there are common elements
across markets which evolve from national characteristics and rationalizing
law courts, but the idiosyncratic elements justify a model which abstracts
from aggregating the interests of disparate groups of traders in dierent mar-
kets. (2) The feedback between practices the international market and the
domestic market which may be linked to it deserves a full development in
a separate paper. For some international markets this linkage is probably
quite weak, as when the importers sell directly to nal consumers. (3) See
the next section for analysis of linkage of markets across countries. It brings
in a set of new issues but does not vitiate the analysis of this section.
The classical liberal optimist believed that exogenous changes in trade
conditions which increased the volume of trade would in addition stimulate
an endogenous improvement in the institutions of trade, interpreted here
as an increase in the enforcement probability  which raises the execution
probability . The formal analysis of this hypothesis characterizes the sign of
the change in the optimal  with respect to changes in the parameters which
govern the volume of trade, b; c and the parameters of trade costs, both
the sunk cost portion and the dispersion of the zero mean shocks to outside
13options. We examine technological progress in trade with reductions i in
the sunk cost functions ti(qi)=i: The dispersion of shocks  matters only on
the excess side where it aects the probability of default and the expected
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and ps;pb are given by previous steps as
p
b = p
 + (1   )b
p
s = p
b + (1   )p
   m(;)(1   )(1   ):
Maximizing  with respect to  requires  = 0 at a point where  <
0: Let z = (b;c;s;b;); the parameter vector. The comparative statics
of endogenous enforcement are given by d=dz; which is signed by z =














 + m) = 0 (16)
where "s is the supply elasticity spss0=s, ps is given by (10), and m =
m[()]: The remainder of this section will evaluate the sign of d=dz by
signing
gz + gz:
Note that g = [(b   p)   m(1   )][1   (b   p + m)@"s=@ps] > 0 for
@"s=@ps  0: We assume @"s=@ps  0; hence g > 0 in what follows. The
condition holds, for example, in the constant trade cost elasticity case. z is
signed by hz = @ ln(s=d)=@z:
142.1 Increases in the Arbitrage Margin
Rises in the arbitrage margin b c come either through increases in willingness
to pay b or decreases in procurement cost c:
Focusing on b; d=db is signed by gb + gb: b is signed by hb =
@ ln(s=d)=@b: A one unit increase in b raises b   pb by (1   !) so it raises
d while it also raises s by increasing ps by [(1 )+!(1  +] 2 [0;1]:
The eect on the match probability depends on the relative strength of these
opposing forces. b > 0 as the elasticity of supply is large relative to the
elasticity of demand or as the bargaining power of sellers ! is large. The rst
term can be positive or negative:
gb = "








= (1   ) + !( + 1   ) 2 [0;1]:
For suciently large supply elasticity, gb > 0; guaranteeing d=db > 0: For
very small supply and demand elasticities, hb is small and gb < 0; hence
d=db < 0:
Reductions in c aect  according to the sign of gc+gc. The net eect
on the match probability, c depends on the relative strength of the same
two eects as with b. A one unit reduction in c increases supply because it
raises ps c, by !+(1 !)(1 ): However it also raises demand because it
reduces pb by (1   !): c > 0 as the elasticity of supply is large relative to
the elasticity of demand and as the sellers' bargaining power ! is large. As for
gc =  (1 !)(1 +) "s(1 !)+(b p+m)(@es=@ps)(1 !)(1 +) <
0 for @"s=@ps  0: Thus reductions in c will increase  whenever the supply
elasticity is suciently large relative to the elasticity of demand or as the
bargaining power of sellers is large, both acting to make c > 0:
2.2 Reductions in Trade Costs
Technological progress in trading lowers ti multiplicatively, eectively raising
b(b   p) on the buyers' side and s(p   c) on the sellers' side. Neutral
technological progress b = s =  illustrates the principles involved and
is a convenient benchmark. A rise in  will shift the ratio s=d unless the
elasticities of demand and supply with respect to gross gains b p and p c
respectively are the same.  > 0 as the elasticity of supply is large relative
15to the elasticity of demand or as the bargaining power of sellers is large (so
p approaches p): As for direct eects, g > 0 since "s = spss0=s is raised
by the rise in : Thus d=d > 0 when the elasticity of supply is suciently
large relative to the elasticity of demand.
2.3 Reductions in Dispersion
The distribution of shocks to the outside options of buyers aects the equi-
librium of the model via two channels, a direct eect on  and an eect on
m: The eect of  on  is implicitly assumed to be oset by a change in 
such that  is an instrument in (16). Thus the further eect changes in 
on altering the optimal  comes via the eect of the change in m: Obviously,
m < 0; greater dispersion reduces still further the negative expected value
of shocks below the critical value times the probability of such shocks. The




= m(1   )(1   ) < 0:
This implies  < 0: Moreover








For suciently large supply elasticity, g < 0: Thus for suciently large sup-
ply elasticity, d=d < 0; reductions in dispersion induce better enforcement
of contracts.
2.4 Summary of Implications
Factors which stimulate international trade | increases in the arbitrage mar-
gin, reductions in trade costs and reductions in the probability of favorable
outside options leading to default | all lead to an improvement in enforce-
ment of contracts whenever the supply elasticity is large relative to the de-
mand elasticity. Under this condition, the exogenous shifts which favor trade
act to reduce the congestion externality facing traders on the excess side of
the market, and the analysis shows that this stimulates the oer of better
terms to the scarce side of the market.
The foregoing suggests testable implications for enforceability across mar-
kets. Contract enforcement is a complex process of responding to unforeseen
16contingencies and necessarily incomplete terms. It therefore is understood
by lawyers as a blend of customary practices and formal adjudication, the
latter codifying the former to some extent. While formal process is common
across markets, the details of response to particular contingencies are likely
to be particular to individual markets. Application of the model to enforce-
ability would ideally be based on analysis of the outcome of many contracts
within and across markets using a logit or probit econometric model. Data
limitations may preclude such an ambitious method, and potential data sets
would face a very signicant censoring problem in the contracts which get
enforced but do not appear in the formal system resulting in records visible
to the investigator. An alternative procedure links imperfect enforcement
to `trade costs' measured with gravity models (Anderson and Marcouiller,
2002). The model of this paper suggests that it should be fruitful to explain
the cross section variation of enforcement-linked trade costs in terms of the
determinants of enforcement.
3 Market Rivalry
An important feature of international economic history is commercial rivalry:
Genoa vs. Venice, London vs. Amsterdam, and more recently Hong Kong
vs. Singapore. The classical liberal hypothesis is also optimistic about ri-
valry between markets, rejecting actively managed trade by mercantilistic
states. The civilizing commerce hypothesis can be understood to imply pos-
itive knock-on eects of intensied rivalry in enforcement between entrepots.
The model is readily adapted to analyze this hypothesis. Simply introduce
a second market, also in excess demand, to which supply ows in competi-
tion with the rst market. We deal with two rivals only, but the insights
extend straightforwardly to more than two. The structure of default and the
expected prices of the various actions are exactly the same in form in the two
markets. The linkage of the markets comes through interdependence in the
number of scarce supply side traders. For simplicity the number of excess
side traders in the two markets remains independent. The interdependence
of supply side traders induces interdependence in the match probabilities on
the two markets.
In the multimarket setting, the optimal enforcement parameter depends
on the enforcement of other markets. In the most natural game setting, the
enforcement parameters are chosen simultaneously. The optimal enforcement
17level in Nash play is that which maximizes the probability of a match, given
the enforcement parameter chosen in the rival market. All the analysis of the
preceding section applies, but for given rival enforcement. The simultaneous
choice of optimal strategies gives the Nash equilibrium of enforcement.
Based on the preceding sections, the home market setup is duplicated
alongside a foreign market with the foreign market variables being denoted
with *'s. There is one small exception: the spot market expected bargained
price now becomes p in the home market and p in the foreign market.
3.1 Two Market Setup
The link between the two markets comes through interdependent trading
costs of suppliers on the two markets. The basic idea is that traders dier
in aptitude both between themselves (some know more than others) and
between markets (some know one market better than another). Formally, the
home and foreign trade cost functions are given by ts(q;q); ts(q;q) where
all the rst derivatives are positive (the perfect substitutes special case being
ts(q + q) = ts): We also assume, plausibly, that the second derivatives are
nonnegative (convex unit costs). This assumption is sucient for our key
result, so we examine it again below. The trade cost functions give rise to















Under the assumptions on trade costs, sp > 0;sp < 0;s
p < 0;s
p > 0:
The objective probability of matching is given by [(1  )s]=[d s] and
similarly for the foreign market. Rational expectations equilibrium requires









To solve, we must substitute in the expressions for the various buyer and
seller expected prices on the right hand side to obtain functions of the two
match probabilities (;) and the two execution probabilities (;). It
is convenient to analyze the existence and uniqueness of a solution to this
system in two steps. First, consider solving the rst equation for  given
18;;: This is exactly the procedure in Anderson and Young, who show
that there always exists a unique solution. The same procedure gives a
solution for  given ;;: Next, we can show that there is a unique
solution for the pair ; given ;:
Lemma 1 There is a unique solution for match probabilities ; and
thus for buyer and seller expected prices for any value of the execution prob-
abilities.
Proof: Let the objective home match probability be written as a function
f(;;;) and let the foreign objective match probability be written as the
function g(;;;): The conditional solution functions are (;;) 
fj   f(;;;) = 0g for the home match probability and similarly for
the foreign match probability. The Lemma is proved if these functions cross
in the unit box once only. First we note that they are conned to the interior
of the unit box by their construction, except possibly at the point (1;1). Sec-
ond,  = f=(1 f) 2 (0;1) since 0 < f <  f under our assumptions
on trade costs, hence supply derivatives: By the same reasoning, 
 2 (0;1);
hence 0 <  < 1=
: Thus the two functions must cross once only.jj
On the excess side of the market the traders are presumed able to design
rules which eectively set  or  prior to the onset of trade in order to
achieve a desirable level of surplus. As in Anderson and Young, their surplus-
maximizing policy boils down to maximizing the match probability. Since the
markets are interdependent, however, they face a Prisoner's Dilemma type
of structure. Let the solution values of the match probabilities be denoted
(;) and (;): These are dened as
(;













In playing Nash against each other, it is very plausible that the groups of
traders should take the match probability in the other market as given. Thus








The second order condition for surplus maximization for each set of traders
implies that  < 0; 
 < 0. The stability condition implies that

   
 > 0: The key issue of the paper is the sign of
d











If these are positive then enforcement strategies are strategic complements.
If negative, enforcement strategies are strategic substitutes.
To analyze the issue of complementarity/substitutability, note rst that
 = ( + 














The ratios are positive, by Lemma 1, while it is apparent that the cross
eects  = f=(1   f) are negative because sellers are attracted to the
other market by better execution probabilities there, lowering the chance of



































































@ =   d
s2sp @ps
@ < 0:









































































Examining f; the term outside the square bracket is positive while the
analogous term outside the square bracket for f is negative. Thus the sign
of d=d is that of the square bracket term. Inside the square bracket,
the second term is positive for linear unit costs (implying spp = 0) and can
dominate the negative rst term as the elasticity of supply is large. This
eect is reinforced as spp > 0; unit trade costs are convex. We now collect
results and the implications:
Lemma 2 For suciently elastic supply of traders and weakly convex
unit costs, enforcement strategies are strategic complements.
The implications are well-known in a technical sense but their application
to enforcement rivalry is worth reviewing in some detail. Figure 2 presents
the case where enforcement strategies are complements while Figure 3 depicts
the case where strategies are substitutes.









In Figure 2, point N gives the Nash equilibrium strategies, point M gives
the home monopoly strategy. Notice that the inception of trade in the foreign
market induces an improvement in enforcement in both markets. Essentially,
both markets compete for scarce side traders by oering better terms. By
Lemma 2, such optimistic predictions about the civilizing aspects of the
22spread of commerce are justied when the supply of traders is suciently
elastic.









In contrast, Figure 3 presents the case of strategic substitutes. Point N
once again gives the Nash equilibrium strategies, point M the home monopoly
strategy. In this case, the inception of trade in the foreign market, by draw-
23ing o traders from the home market, makes it optimal to reduce the level
of enforcement to more eectively exploit those traders who remain. This
pessimistic outcome may provide insight into the eect of the inception of
European long distance commercial ties on regional markets in Asia.
Cooperation in enforcement is represented by point J on Figures 2 and 3.
Point J depicts the joint surplus maximizing strategies. Cooperation induces
an improvement in enforcement over Nash strategies when complementarity
obtains. In contrast, when strategic substitutability obtains, joint surplus
maximization involves reducing enforcement below the Nash level. Coopera-
tion is more plausible if a single government takes over control of enforcement
in both markets. The analysis thus implies that `rational' imperialism leads
to improved enforcement only under the special conditions of strategic com-
plementarity. Could British imperialism in North America be interpreted as
a case of complementarity while British imperialism in Asia and Africa is
interpreted as a case of substitutability?
4 Globalization
Globalization arises in part from a fall in eective trade costs. Does global-
ization in this sense raise or lower enforcement in Nash equilibrium?
We can model a single homogeneous trade cost reduction, or an asymmet-
ric one. Globalization understood as a technological improvement is consis-
tent with a homogeneous trade cost reduction: ts(q;q;) = T s(q;q)=; ts(q;q;) =
T s(q;q)=; whereby a rise in  shrinks the base trade costs uniformly. Al-
ternatively, reductions in trade costs in a single country are consistent with
national deregulation, tari cuts or the eects of factor price changes.
In the case of global technological progress, the supply schedules are func-
tions of the willingness-to-pay for shipping in each market, (ps   c) and
(ps   c): The eect of a rise in shipping eciency on supply is given by
s = sp(p
s   c)= + sp(p
s   c
)= > 0:
Here we use the (plausible) dominance of own eects over cross eects in trade
costs to sign the net eect. Similarly, s
 > 0: Thus a rise in shipping eciency
reduces the negative congestion externality in excess demand markets. What
is the eect on the optimal level of enforcement?
If enforcement levels are strategic complements, then globalization is con-
tagious, a uniform fall in trade costs will induce a further reduction in trade
24costs associated with imperfect contract enforcement in both countries. If
enforcement levels are strategic substitutes,this reduces the positive knock-
on eect as compared to the complementarity case, but the eect of a trade
cost reduction is still positive.
Trade cost reductions understood as trade liberalization or deregulation
tend to occur in one country only. Contract enforcement improves in the
country which experiences the cost reduction. The other country has an
incentive to reduce its contract enforcement under strategic substitutes but
to improve its enforcement under strategic complements. Thus resolving the
issue of strategic substitutability/complementarity is crucial to comparative
static predictions.
5 Conclusion
The theme of this conference is \New Directions in Trade Theory". One such
direction is the endogenization of the institutional foundation of trade. This
paper and its predecessor take a small step in that direction by analyzing the
comparative statics of a model of the demand for contract enforcement by
traders. While the basic model is complex, Anderson and Young (2006) argue
that it contains the minimal structure needed to address the subject. The
present paper indicates that the model is a platform capable of supporting
extensions. The model and its extension yields several useful insights and
may yield more, as suggested below.
Still, other approaches may ultimately be more fruitful. An interesting
alternative is oered in Dixit (2003), in which reputation sustains informal
enforcement when markets are small, but breaks down to be replaced by
costly formal enforcement when markets are large. What does seem rmly
established is that the direction (of endogenous institutions of trade) is an
important one on which progress can be made.
A highly speculative use of the model may make sense of world economic
history. Joel Mokyr poses a key question in The Lever of Riches: why
did China, with a clear lead in all relevant technologies in 1500 CE, fall
decisively behind in the next 300 years of economic development? One answer
suggested here (not his answer) is that the decentralized political structure of
Europe permitted the rise of a number of competing entrepots while China
was controlled by a single government. Suppose, as is plausible, that the
elasticity of supply of traders was low during this period in both Europe
25and China. Entrepot competition under strategic substitutability, all else
equal, would have forced traders in each location to evolve laws and customs
which treated foreigners and outsiders more fairly and transparently than in
China. Over time (acting outside the model), the returns to trade in Europe
may have drawn ever more resources into supporting trade, consequently
raising elasticities to ip strategic interaction over into complementarity and
inducing further improvements in enforcement.
The model may also help make sense of modern developments in third
world and transition economies. Despite a rapid decline in eective trade
costs, there has been no general dramatic improvement in the security of
contract. Parts of South Asia appear to have reached European levels. There
appears to be a recognition that it is useful for the major entrepots to em-
ulate good practices elsewhere. In terms of the model, the `outsiders' who
act on the excess side of the market represent trading cultures which may
be associated with high elasticity of supply, tending to satisfy the sucient
condition for the positive knock-on eect. In contrast, in Africa the condi-
tions appear to be reversed and globalization may be worsening the security
of trade.
These speculations suggest future empirical work to see if the theoretical
model makes sense of patterns of institutional development in contract en-
forcement. Greif (2005) emphasizes the large payo to case studies, including
payo in improved theory.
In the line of theoretical development, the model suggests several fruitful
lines. First, the model makes no distinction between formal and informal
enforcement. It might be useful to consider a setup where both types are
active, on the suspicion that the two may be complements or substitutes,
depending on details of the model. Anderson and Young (2006) review a
model of contract specicity due to Caballero and Hammour (1998) that
might be taken to represent formal enforcement while  represents informal
enforcement in the model. Second, the supply side of enforcement from the
government is not modeled in this paper. It might be useful to set up a model
of the government, describing its objectives and the constraints it faces in
setting up enforcement and collecting the taxes to pay for it. Such a model
might provide the basis for an examination of the optimal or ecient number
of jurisdictions. Any such eorts should be guided by detailed descriptions
of institutional particularities, as advocated by Greif.
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287 Appendix: Lemmas 1-6
Lemma 1: (A) For  2 [0;1] there exists a unique () satisfying (8).
(0) =  ;(1) = 0:
(B) For  2 [[0;1], there exists a () 2 [0;1] satisfying (6). (0) =
0;(1) = 1.
Proof of Lemma 1 (A) To apply Rolles Theorem to (8), note that
as !   , m()0 so =m() ! 1. As  !  ,  =m() becomes negative.
Given a piecewise continuous probability density function f(),  =m() is
monotonic and continuous in . Rolles Theorem implies that there is a
()between  and  satisfying (8). This is unique since  =m() is mono-
tonic in . For  = 0, the requisite  is   . For  = 1, the requisite  is 0.
mu() is monotonic and dierentiable in . (B) To apply Rolles Theorem
to (9), note that as  ! 0, (1   )= ! 1 so the solution to (8) () !  ,
and (1   )=F(()) ! 1 > 1    when 0 < . As  ! 1, (1   )= ! 0,
so () ! 0, F(()) ! F(0) so (1   )=F(()) ! 0 < 1    when  < 1.
Moreover, (1   )=F(()) is continuous in . Rolles Theorem now implies
that there exists a  2 [0;1] satisfying (9). For  = 0, the requisite  is 0.
For  = 1, the requisite  is 1.
Lemma 2: If d(p > s(p), then for each  2 [0;1], (14) has a unique
solution[] 2 (0;1).
Proof of Lemma 2 From the text, the objective probability of a match







b + (1   )p
   m(())(1   )(1   )
p
b = p
 + (1   )b
p
 = !b + (1   !)c:





Suppose that  2 [0;1). As  approaches 0 from above, h(;) remains
positive so that h(;) > . Since h(;) is continuous in , Rolles Theorem
29now implies that the equation
 = h(;) (17)
has a solution [] in the open interval (0;1). This is unique since @ps=@ =

















 + (1   )b
so [1] = (b   pe)=(b   p) . Since pe < p in an excess demand equilibrium,
[1] 2 (0;1). ||
Lemma 3: In an excess demand equilibrium, a seller victimized by a
repudiated, unenforced contract expects a higher payo from entering the
spot market than from renegotiating with the repudiator or returning to his
home market, provided that under any cost disturbance , he expects gains
from spot trade. This would be true if and only if:
!(b   c + m) >   (19)
where  is the worst (most negative) realization of .
Lemma 4: (A) In an excess demand equilibrium, a seller who learns his
cost disturbance expects higher prots from honoring the contract than from
entering the spot market, provided that cost disturbances are small compared




i.e., the worst cost disturbance to the seller is less than the cuto value
(()) of the buyers benet disturbance (at which he would be indierent
between honoring and repudiating the contract) weighted by the relative
bargaining power of sellers. (B) If (19) also holds, then the seller expects
higher prots from honoring the contract than from returning to his home
market or renegotiating with his counter-party.
Proof of Lemma 3 A seller default victim expects the willingness-to-
pay of a repudiator in re-negotiations to be b + m ; on the spot market he
30expects to meet some buyers who entered directly whose willingness-to-pay
in spot negotiations he expects to be b. Consequently, he expects a higher
price in negotiations on the spot market than with the buyer who repudiated
his contract. Specically, he expects to negotiate a price with the repudiator
of p+!m while he would expect to achieve a higher price on the spot market
of !b+(1 !)c+!m. His expected gain from spot trade is !(b c+m)+,
which is positive under hypothesis (19). Thus, he expects to do better than
by returning home, which oers no gains from trade. Since the seller is always
matched in an excess demand equilibrium, he expects a higher payo from
(i) entering the spot market than from (ii) renegotiating with the repudiator
or (iii) returning home. It follows that (i) would be chosen by a victim faced
with alternatives (ii) and (iii) without knowing the disturbance realized by
the repudiator.
Proof of Lemma 4 (A) A seller who learns his cost disturbance 
expects to negotiate a price on the spot market equal to the price that he
expected before learning his cost disturbance plus the increase  (1   !) in
that negotiated price due to the disturbance of his cost from its expected
value. This second term is certainly less than its value  (1   !) under
his worst (most negative) cost disturbance. Thus, the seller expects a higher
price from honoring the contract than from a spot negotiation, provided that:
p
C   (p




 + !m) = [p
C   (p
 + !m)] (22)
Substituting from (13) for ps   (p + !m), we conclude that (22) holds
provided that:

[(1   ) + !=(1   )] >  (1   !):
Given hypothesis (20), this will be true because:
(1   )=! + =(1   ) > 1:
(B) An argument similar to that for Lemma 3 shows that if (19) holds,
then a seller who enters the spot market expects higher prots than by re-
turning home. Thus, if both (19) and (20) hold, then the seller expects more
from honoring his contract than from returning home. Next, consider what
31a seller expects from repudiating his contract and renegotiating with his vic-
tim. His victim will require a price no less than what he expects to negotiate
on the spot market. His required price will depend on his benet disturbance.
The seller would not know this benet disturbance when he repudiates the
contract; his expectations would be based on the distribution of benet dis-
turbances across buyers. The seller rationally expects any renegotiation to
extract no more than the price pb that buyers themselves expect to negotiate
on the spot market before they learn their benet disturbance. (7) implies
that in equilibrium, this is less than the contract price pC. Thus, a seller
expects more from honoring his contract than from renegotiating with his
victim.
Lemma 5  < 0;m < 0, and F < 0:
Proof of Lemma 5
To compute how  aects (), dierentiate (8) logarithmically with



















m = f: (24)
At  = () > 0, the square bracket is negative so  < 0 and thus m < 0.













0 2 (0;  ) then  > 0 for all  2 [0;1]. This is true when  is
uniformly distributed, in which case () =
p
.
Proof of Lemma 6 Dierentiating (9) logarithmically using g() 





























32where the equality follows by (8). This has the same sign as:
f( m + )   mF   
2fF =  m(F   f)   
2f(1   F) (25)
This is positive at  under conditions provided in the working paper version
of Anderson and Young (2006). Suppose that  is uniformly distributed
between w and w for some constant w. Then: m() = (   w)=2;F() =
















1    = (1   )=F(()) = 1   
2;
so () =
p
.
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